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Nonstandard work in Europe is not a new phenomenon (see, e.g.,
Ricca 1982).1 Neither are attempts to measure and to regulate the
employment conditions attached to it. For example, over 30 years have
passed since the European Commission issued a draft directive on tem-
porary work. Although this issue was revisited during the 1980s and
1990s, when directives regulating the working conditions of part-time
and fixed-contract work were introduced, workers placed through a
temporary work agency remain unregulated at the European level
(Income Data Services 2000; EIROline 2000a).
This regulatory situation has evolved in the context of a series of
changes in the employment structure of the European Union (EU) and,
in particular, the efforts of nation states to re-regulate their labor mar-
kets in the face of a series of economic, social, and political changes.
On one hand, the last three decades have witnessed the increased use of
nonstandard employment contracts across the EU, as the move toward
ever more “flexible” labor markets has become a political objective of
all governments. On the other hand, the extent and quality of nonstand-
ard work that has developed differs across countries owing to the struc-
turing influence of the specific national institutional context. Thus, it is
necessary to examine the national regulatory structures that operate
within the EU framework regulations. This chapter does this by
answering two questions. First, why is nonstandard employment
increasing in the EU, and where is this growth concentrated? Second,
what are the implications of this growth for workers in nonstandard
employment? Our argument is developed through an analytical focus
on the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
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The second section of this chapter defines the different types of
nonstandard employment, focusing specifically on two types of tempo-
rary employment—fixed-term contract and temporary agency work—
and part-time employment. It summarizes the reasons for the emer-
gence of nonstandard work arrangements and reviews the trends in the
rates of part-time and temporary employment. In the third section we
discuss the differences in the recent evolution of the national regulatory
frameworks and the discourses within which employment and labor
market policy reforms are currently situated in the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands. Although the United Kingdom has moved closer
to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “liberal” welfare regime, with labor mar-
ket deregulation and a “residual” welfare state, the Netherlands has
kept in place a “Janus-headed welfare regime, combining both social
democratic and conservative attributes” (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.
86). This comparison illustrates the different ways that EU employ-
ment and labor regulatory reform are developed at the national level,
depending on the political and societal context of individual nation
states. In the fourth and fifth sections of the chapter, we compare the
economic profile of nonstandard employment, the segments of the
economy in which nonstandard work is increasing, and the characteris-
tics of the workforce who occupy these jobs in both countries. In con-
clusion, we consider the development trajectory of the regulation of
nonstandard employment in both countries and the EU more broadly. 
DEFINING AND MAPPING NONSTANDARD WORK 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NETHERLANDS
Nonstandard work arrangements deviate from the full-time, open-
ended “standard” employee contract. Part-time work is one form of
nonstandard work, and is broadly defined as less than full-time hours,
although in a few European countries, a specified hour threshold is
used in some official definitions.2 The average hours worked by part-
timers vary between countries, but then so do average hours for full-
timers (Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998).
Temporary work is the other main type of nonstandard work. There
are a variety of forms of temporary work, and different categories are
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used among countries to refer to the same sets of workers (Income
Data Services 2000, pp. 16–17). Temporary contracts include employ-
ees hired directly by the company and those hired through the interme-
diary of temporary work agencies.3 In this chapter, we use the term
“temporary work agency” to mean an organization that “provides client
firms with workers on an as-needed basis” (Segal and Sullivan 1999, p.
117).4 We examine the trends in fixed-term contracts and temporary
agency work (see Figure 3.1 for a glossary of terms) to explore the
dynamics of change within the temporary employment sector. 
In this chapter, we focus on part-time work and temporary con-
tracts, but a third type of nonstandard work should also be noted—the
emergence of new forms of self-employment associated with employ-
ers’ use of subcontracting. This includes the independent self-
employed plus other forms of self-employment that can be considered
to be more akin to temporary employee contractual relationships, such
as contract workers, dependent self-employed, and freelance workers.5
Employers’ labor use practices in any area of production are
shaped by the market conditions, labor regulations, industrial relations,
and other institutional factors. In Europe, the expansion of nonstandard
work arrangements has largely been driven by employers’ demands for
greater workforce flexibility in the context of heightened international
competition and product market uncertainty. Their ability to pursue this
restructuring has been facilitated by their increased bargaining muscle
Figure 3.1 Definitions of Different Terms Related to Temporary 
Employment
• Temporary work agency (TWA): An organization whose employees
work at a range of client organizations for an often unspecified period of
time.
• Temporary agency worker: An employee of a TWA who works at a cli-
ent organization.
• Directly employed temporary worker: An employee employed directly
by the organization at which he or she works.
• Fixed-term contract: A delimited contract under which an employee is
either directly employed or employed through a TWA. 
• Temporary worker: An employee in one of a range of nonpermanent
contracts.
56 Fagan and Ward
in industrial relations from the mid-1970s as high unemployment rates
emerged and trade union density declined. 
Bosch (1995) identifies three related pressures behind the growth
of nonstandard work arrangements and working-time restructuring that
are found in varying degrees in companies across all sectors and mem-
ber states in the EU. First, operating and opening hours are being
extended to make more intensive use of capital equipment and to pro-
vide more responsive and flexible delivery and service times. Often
this has been stimulated by statutory deregulation of limits on operat-
ing hours. Second, working-time schedules and employment contracts
are being reorganized to achieve a closer match between staff levels
and both predictable and unpredictable variations in labor demand at
different times of the day, week, and year to reduce the volume of labor
purchased. Third, the reorganization of schedules and contracts is also
about reducing the unit cost of labor by minimizing overtime or “unso-
cial hours” premia (weekend and night work). This reorganization may
also permit cheaper pools of workers to be recruited, further reducing
unit labor costs. The result is a reorganization of work for standard
employees and increased deployment of part-time and temporary
employees. There is mounting evidence that this flexibility drive has
intensified work during the 1990s in Europe (European Foundation
1998; Green 2000).6
Additional reasons related to labor supply issues lie behind the
expansion of part-time work. Employers began to create this form of
employment in some countries with labor market shortages in the
1960s as a specific tool to recruit married women with domestic
responsibilities. Subsequently, part-time work has also been encour-
aged by “work-family” public policy in some countries to increase
women’s labor market participation rates. State policy to facilitate a
market-led expansion of part-time work, for example by removing fis-
cal disincentives or labor law restrictions, is one element of this, but
the work-family public policy has a wider agenda. This includes
improving the quality of part-time work through equal treatment in
terms and conditions and, in some countries, legislation or collective
agreements also provide employees with certain entitlements to reduce
their hours to part-time in their existing job. This is an established part
of the Swedish parental leave system, for example, and the public sec-
tor working-time policy in France, and the policy has recently been
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introduced into Dutch labor law (see below). Thus, in many European
countries, the origins of part-time work are rooted in a modification of
the “male breadwinner” arrangement of the gender division of labor, in
response to either labor shortages or equal opportunity policies. Rather
than women withdrawing from the labor market upon marriage or
childbirth, part-time work offered one means of combining paid and
unpaid work, particularly where alternative sources of child care were
scarce, costly, or socially unacceptable (O’Reilly and Fagan 1998). 
In a recent review of European research, the main company-level
factors that contribute to the use of part-time contracts in Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries were
identified (Delsen 1998). The research shows that workload variations
over the day, week, or year are important, but they do not determine
whether companies use part-time contracts because alternative solu-
tions, such as full-time shifts, can be used. This is the usual solution in
manufacturing and transportation, where the workforce is largely male.
Workload variations are influential, but part-time jobs are the most
prevalent in companies that operate in the service sector and that rely
on women to fill jobs that have few or no formal human capital entry
requirements. An additional incentive for the use of part-time work is
when the cost structure of production is dominated by labor costs and
employers perceive that the fixed costs and hourly labor costs of part-
time employees are cheaper than hiring full-time staff (hourly wages,
fringe benefits, social security costs, and recruitment and training
costs). However, direct cost savings are not a major consideration in all
companies or sectors. For example, a European survey of companies
that used part-time contracts found that the main reasons employers
gave for using part-time contracts were to enhance the competitiveness
and quality of the service or product by extending opening hours or
covering workload peaks, improving recruitment and retention to over-
come labor or skill shortages, and higher productivity. These reasons
were mentioned more often than direct savings on hourly labor costs
(European Foundation 1994).
A range of factors lies behind the use of temporary workers by
companies (see Atkinson, Morris, and Williams 1999; Davis-Blake and
Uzzi 1993). In some contexts, the recruitment of temporary workers is
believed to offer various advantages. These include lower labor costs
because of the flexibility to cover variable staffing requirements and
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fewer, if any, entitlements to fringe benefits and occupational pensions;
a buffer to protect the employment security of the core workforce; a
source of rapid recruitment or access to specialist skills; or a screening
period prior to appointment on an open-ended contract. The potential
disadvantages are often the flip side of many of these advantages, such
as the costs of recruitment and training; high turnover; the administra-
tive burden; lower levels of skill, reliability, and commitment; and a
negative effect on the morale of the core workforce. Temporary work
agencies operating as “intermediaries” offer the potential to overcome
some of the recruitment, training, and administrative costs, but compa-
nies are still faced with problems of lower organizational commitment
among their temporary workforce and the effects on morale of their
core workforce (Allen and Henry 1996, 1997; Ward et al. 2001). 
Table 3.1 presents data on the prevalence of part-time and fixed-
term work in the EU. By 1999, 18 percent of all employed persons in
the EU-15 were in part-time jobs, and 13 percent of employees had a
fixed-term contract. Part-time work has been increasing for a number
of years in most member states, and since the early 1980s, most of the
net job growth in the EU has been in part-time work for both women
and men (Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998, pp. 29–39; European Com-
mission 1996, p. 17; European Commission 1999a, p. 20). The expan-
sion in the rate of temporary work contracts has been more recent.
Most of the additional jobs created in the economic recovery in the
early 1990s were both part-time and temporary, and the increasing rate
of fixed-term contracts has continued subsequently.7 There is a degree
of overlap between these two categories because the rate of part-time
work is higher for those in fixed-term contracts than those in open-
ended contracts in most member states (Rubery, Fagan, and Smith
1995, pp. 185–188). Further expansion in both forms of nonstandard
work can be expected in many countries based on these trends.
Within the broad category of temporary workers, the particular
issue of temporary agency work is the subject of current policy and
academic debate in Europe (Michon 2000), mirroring concern about
this form of employment restructuring in the United States (Barker and
Christensen 1998; Peck and Theodore 2001). A recent European-wide
overview of temporary agency work found rapid growth over the last
10 years across Europe, although this form of engagement still repre-
sents a small proportion of total employment (Michon 2000).
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Shift-share analysis (Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998; Walwei
1998) shows that there is a diffusion occurring in the use of part-time
work across economic sectors in the EU. Temporary employment also
appears to be spreading owing to a change in employers’ practices and
not simply to the expansion of industrial sectors or occupations with
existing high levels of usage or as a cautious response to economic
recovery in the business cycle. For example, shift-share analysis has
shown diffusion across sectors to be the dominant component of the
expansion in temporary employment in the United Kingdom during the
1990s (Casey, Metcalf, and Willwards 1997, Table 2.6). However, the
bulk of nonstandard jobs remains concentrated in a narrow range of
low-status, low-paid service jobs, as we will see below.
Table 3.1 Trends in Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment in the 
European Union, 1985–99
1985 1990 1995 1999
Employed: % who work part-time
Netherlands 23 32 37 39
United Kingsom 21 22 24 25
EU-15 11 14 16 18
Employees: % with fixed-term contracts
Netherlands 8 8 11 12
UK 7 5 7 7
EU-15 9 10 12 13
NOTE: Part-time work is based on the individual’s self-assessment of his or her full- or
part-time status. Employees with fixed-term contracts include the following catego-
ries in the European Labor Force Survey: employee hired for a job that ends on a spe-
cific date, completion of a task, or the return of another employee who has been
temporarily replaced; persons engaged by an agency or employment exchange and
hired to a third party to perform a specific task (note that persons with a written work
contract of unlimited duration with the agency or employment exchange are not
counted as temporary employees); seasonal employees; and persons with specific
training contracts.
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey. Data for 1985–96 extracted from European
Commission Employment in Europe, 1996 and 1997 editions. Data for 1999 is from
the European Labor Force Survey published results, Tables 28 and 34.
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As a result of these trends, both part-time and temporary employ-
ment have become a more common route into employment in Europe
as economies restructure following the 1990s recession. For example,
in 1997, 70 percent of the men and women who entered employment
did so via fixed-term contracts, up from 50 percent in 1994. Forty per-
cent of the women who found employment took part-time jobs, as did
almost 14 percent of men (European Commission, 1999a, pp. 44–48).
The growing significance of temporary contracts as a route into
employment is evident even in countries with relatively low overall
rates of fixed-term contracts, such as the United Kingdom (Sly and
Stillwell 1997).
These trends in the expansion of nonstandard work have occurred
across both peaks and troughs in the business cycle, and signal ongoing
structural changes in European labor markets and employers’ recruit-
ment practices (European Commission 1999a, p. 47). Yet within the
EU, there are national differences in the rates of nonstandard work
arrangements. The highest rate of part-time work in the EU is in the
Netherlands, and part-time work is also particularly common in the
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark. Taken together, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom account for just over one-third of all
part-time workers in the EU-15. There are also national differences in
the incidence of temporary work contracts, but to a lesser degree than
in the case of part-time work. The highest levels of temporary employ-
ment tend to exist in countries where labor laws permit (and even
encourage) this form of contract and where regulations make it difficult
and costly to dismiss employees with open-ended contracts (Rogowski
and Schömann 1996). This form of employment is particularly preva-
lent in Spain (for further discussion see Cebrián et al., this volume).
The rate of fixed-term contracts in the Netherlands is close to the EU
average, while the rate is notably lower in the United Kingdom, given
the weak regulatory governance of the labor market that offers only
limited employment protection for any employee with less than one
year’s tenure with the company.
National studies in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom—the
two countries that are the focus of this chapter—show that the use of
part-time workers and, at a lower incidence, temporary workers, is
spreading at the company level. By 1998, 84 percent of all U.K. work-
places with 25 or more employees used part-time employees, and 58
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percent had at least 10 percent of their workforce on part-time con-
tracts (Cully et al. 1999, p. 32). In the Netherlands, more than 70 per-
cent of all companies use part-time contracts (Hesselink et al. 1999,
Table 2.3). Despite the relatively low rate of temporary work in the
United Kingdom, fixed-term contracts are now used in 44 percent of
workplaces, temporary agency workers in one-quarter of workplaces,
and freelancers in 13 percent of workplaces.8 Indeed, although in the
last two years the size of the United Kingdom temporary employment
sector as a whole has remained stable, temporary agency work has con-
tinued to increase (Forde and Slater 2001). Comparative research
shows that managers use these contracts for similar reasons in both
countries, although with some difference in emphasis in relation to
part-time work. In both countries, managers explain that part-time
work offers competitive gains, work scheduling, and recruitment
advantages, but those in the United Kingdom place more emphasis on
direct labor cost savings than in the Netherlands (European Foundation
1994). With regard to the use of fixed-term and temporary agency
workers, managers in both countries point to similar benefits; namely,
short-term coverage (e.g., maternity leave), coping with seasonal fluc-
tuations, obtaining specialist skills needed on a short-term basis or
which are only obtainable on a short-term basis, or screening staff for
permanent jobs (Casey, Metcalf, and Willwards 1997; Cully et al.
1999; Hesselink et al. 1999; Sly and Stillwell 1997). In the next sec-
tion, we discuss the regulatory frameworks guiding nonstandard work
contracts in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR NONSTANDARD 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM
The expansion of nonstandard work arrangements has occurred
among all EU member states. However, each nation’s regulatory
framework and the policy context out of which the regulations emerge
have produced differences in the extent, the form, and the relative qual-
ity of nonstandard employment in each country. These national differ-
ences persist even when comparisons are made at the sector level to
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allow for contrasting industrial structures within national economies.
This diversity between countries emerges from a number of different
institutional arrangements. In this section, we set out the recent devel-
opments in the EU regulatory framework and then explore how, in both
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, these wider regulatory
changes combine with those introduced by each nation-state to produce
quite different terms and conditions of employment.
Within the EU, a developing body of framework legislation (EU
directives) and economic policy circumscribe the actions of member
states. EU directives set the minimum regulatory requirement, and any
related national regulations must be compatible with this European-
level law. In the last 30 years, a number of directives have been
adopted that have established a regulatory floor for the working condi-
tions in nonstandard employment. In the 1970s, a series of directives
introduced equal treatment for women and men in matters of equal pay
for work of equal value, recruitment, training, and social security.
These directives were also used successfully in litigation to extend
some elements of equal treatment to part-time employees using the
principal of indirect discrimination on the basis that most part-time
employees are women. In the 1990s, directives were also introduced to
guarantee minimum maternity leave and parental leave entitlements.
Three other directives introduced in the 1990s deal directly with the
regulation of working time and the use of nonstandard workers: the
1993 Working Time Directive, the 1997 Equal Treatment of Part-Time
Workers Directive, and the 1999 directive on Fixed-Term Work (Euro-
pean Commission 1999b). The latter has yet to be introduced into all
member states. See Figure 3.2 for the main revisions of the directives.
And an EU Directive on Temporary Agency Work is due to be
announced in early 2003. 
As these directives were being drawn up, individual nations were
also reforming their own employment systems in the context of rising
unemployment and economic stagnation, which had become a feature
of most European labor markets since the late 1970s. The Netherlands
and the United Kingdom are good examples of regulatory divergence
within the EU in response to these problems. 
Figure 3.2 Main Provisions of the EU Directives Regulating Working 
Time and Nonstandard Work Conditions
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1993 Working Time Directive
A maximum average 48-hour week
Limits on the number of hours worked at night
Daily and weekly rest periods
Four weeks annual paid leave
Encourages the social partners (employers’ associations and trade unions) to
negotiate working-time arrangements that promote the reconciliation of
work and family life
Certain sectors and occupations are exempt (this is currently under review at
the European level).
1997 Equal Treatment for Part-Time Workers
Equal hourly pay to comparable full-timers, including overtime pay for hours
in excess of normal full-time hours
Pro rata entitlements to sick pay and maternity pay
Equal treatment for holidays, maternity leave, parental leave, career breaks,
redundancy provisions, pension schemes, and training
Encourages the social partners to remove obstacles that limit opportunities for
the expansion of part-time work
1999 Fixed-Contract Work
Equal treatment: Fixed-term contract workers should be treated no less favor-
ably than equivalent permanent colleagues within the same undertaking,
or similar jobs elsewhere
Prevention of abuse: Employers should be prohibited from abusing this form
of employment by concluding a series of contracts without justification,
thereby denying workers their rights
SOURCE: Author’s compilation of legislation listed at The Portal to Euro-
pean Union Law which is available at: <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
index.html>. 
In the United Kingdom, under the successive conservative govern-
ments of the 1980s and 1990s, labor market deregulation was actively
pursued as a means of job creation and economic growth through the
reduction of workers’ rights, marginalization of the trade unions, and
the creation of “neoliberal” labor market institutions (Beatson 1995;
Jones 1999; Peck 1996). United Kingdom governments pursued labor
market policies akin to those introduced in the United States, and gen-
erally sought to circumvent European directives on employment regu-
lation. During this period trade union power to negotiate working
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conditions was undermined by the combination of new legal restric-
tions and falling membership, particularly outside the public sector and
in private service-sector companies. Less than half of the United King-
dom’s workforce is now covered by collective agreements (Cully et al.
1999). Although overt hostility to progressive employment reform has
dissipated since the election of two labor governments in 1997 and
2001, the U.K. labor market remains one of the most deregulated in the
EU.
In contrast to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands has a social
democratic political tradition of more regulated employment condi-
tions. This is achieved through statute and comprehensive collective
agreements that encompass the majority of the workforce.9 In this con-
text, a different path was taken to stimulate economic growth and job
creation, the linchpin of which was a social pact between the trade
unions and employers—the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement—supple-
mented by a number of government measures. This introduced wage
constraint, partly compensated by tax reductions introduced by the
state, and a commitment from employers to introduce working-time
reductions that were “cost neutral” (reductions in full-time hours were
to be paid for either by productivity gains or by a proportionate reduc-
tion in the weekly wage so that hourly rates of pay did not rise). This
social pact was reaffirmed and extended in 1993. In parallel, the Dutch
government actively promoted the expansion of part-time work as a
means to job-intensive growth beginning in the 1980s through a com-
bination of subsidies and public employment policies, information
campaigns, and legislation to extend equal treatment to part-time
employees. Support for part-time work with treatment equal to full-
time employees also came from three other constituencies: employers,
trade unions, and women workers. The employers saw part-time work
as a means of diluting pressures for collective reductions in full-time
hours. The trade unions were adapting their policies to represent the
growing constituency of women who were demanding more opportuni-
ties for quality part-time work. A major influence in the growing
demand for part-time work among women in the Netherlands was their
relatively recent entry into the labor force compared with international
standards and the still influential traditional “housewife” model of gen-
der relations (Visser 1999; Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
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Initially, marginal part-time employees working short hours (12
hours or fewer) received less favorable treatment than other part-time
workers in the Netherlands. This was redressed in a series of reforms in
the early 1990s, that extended the statutory minimum wage to all part-
timers (1993), mandated equal treatment in labor law (1996), and out-
lawed hours thresholds for membership in company pension schemes
(Delsen 1998). The latest development, the Part-Time Employment
Act (2000), awards employees the right to request a reduction in their
hours to part-time work, or an increase to full-time work, as part of a
broader drive to facilitate the reconciliation of employment and family
care responsibilities. Employers are only allowed to refuse these
requests on the grounds of specific conflicting business interests
(EIROline 2000c). This builds on earlier developments in collective
bargaining agreements (Van den Burg and Passchier 1999). In compar-
ison with other employees in collective agreements, part-time employ-
ees with short hours still fare worse. However, the general regulatory
trend in the Netherlands is extending equal treatment and developing
part-time work as an integrated, rather than marginal, form of employ-
ment (Plantenga 1997; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
Part-time employees in the United Kingdom, on the other hand,
have relied on cases by individual employees and trade unions under
European Community law for improvements in their terms and condi-
tions. Following a series of legal rulings in the mid-1990s over the
equal treatment of part-time employees in company pension schemes,
equal treatment in statutory employment protection was implemented
in 1995 (Dickens 1995). Since 1997, regulatory reforms have helped to
improve the terms and conditions of part-time employment. In 1999, a
statutory hourly minimum wage for all workers was introduced, and
the qualifying period for employment protection was reduced from two
years to a single year’s service for all employees working eight or more
hours per week.10 Maternity and parental leave entitlements have also
been extended to all workers, again driven by EU regulatory reforms.
The latest extension of these parental rights, which came into effect in
April 2003, includes giving parents of children under 6 and children
with disabilities under 18 the right to apply to work flexibly, which
might be interpreted to include working part-time instead of full-time
hours. Earlier proposals that would have given parents the right to
request part-time hours, similar to the entitlement introduced into
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Dutch law discussed above, were dropped in response to lobbying from
employers’ associations. Under this new law employers have a duty to
consider such requests for flexible working, although they do not have
to justify their opposition in the same detail as is required in the Dutch
law. The Trades Union Congress and other critics argue that this new
right will have little effect in Britain, particularly since there is no
union representation in many private-sector companies (Ward 2003).
Finally, the Equal Treatment Directive became effective in July 2000
and will further improve conditions for some part-time workers.
Despite these gains, however, the criteria set by the government for the
full-time comparator for equal treatment is someone employed by the
same employer under the same type of contract and doing broadly sim-
ilar work. It is estimated that only one million of the six million part-
time workers in the United Kingdom have a comparator based on these
criteria and will therefore gain from the equal treatment regulation
(EIROline, 2000d). To date, the government has rejected trade union
calls for this limitation to be redressed.
Regulatory divergence is also evident in how each nation deals
with those in temporary employment. Dutch labor law was reassessed
in 1997 in light of concern over the increased flexibility and fragmen-
tation of its labor market. Building on an agreement reached in 1996
between the employers and trade unions at the bipartite Labor Founda-
tion (Stichting van de Arbeid), the aim was to uphold both corporate
flexibility and employee security by relaxing dismissal laws and gener-
ating a minimum level of security for employees in flexible jobs, so-
called “flexicurity.” It was proposed that if an employee had worked
for his or her employer for three months (weekly, or at least 20 hours a
month), the law would assume a contract of employment (EIROline
1997a). Where the hours were unspecified, the hours worked by the
employee over the previous three months would be taken as the con-
tracted hours. The responsibility lies with the employer to provide evi-
dence that the hours worked during the period are either longer or
shorter than the hours normally worked by the employee. This contract
has the same terms and conditions as a permanent one. The probation-
ary period—during which time both the employer and the employee
are free to terminate the contract—remained at two months for fixed-
term contracts. It was, however, shortened for “short-term contracts”
that specify a term of employment. The aim was to encourage the use
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of longer-term fixed-term contracts and end the use by companies of
the “revolving door” (EIROline 1997b). Where three of these contracts
were run together, prior notification of termination was required. If the
total length of time of the contracts extended beyond three years, the
contract automatically became a contract for an indefinite period.
As the flexicurity11 bill was being debated in the Netherlands, there
was also an attempt to reform legislation on temporary work agencies.
Temporary workers employed by a temporary work agency for more
than a year received a three-month contract. The agency was required
to pay the employee wages during this period even if he or she did not
work, so long as the employee remained available for work (EIROline
1997a). There was originally no transitional period. After protracted
negotiations, the General Union of Temporary Employment Agencies
(Algemene Bond van Uitzendbureaus) and the unions agreed to a tran-
sitional framework, which allowed the concerns of both parties to be
met. The Flexicurity Act (Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid) took effect
January 1, 1999, while the new act governing temporary work agencies
went into effect six months earlier. The combined effect of these two
acts has substantially modified Dutch labor law (see Figure 3.3)
(EIROline 1999a, 1999b), with both employers’ organizations and
unions at pains to point to the combined successes of the acts. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom has seen more limited improve-
ments in the conditions of fixed-term work. Workers have gained equal
Figure 3.3 Reform of Dutch Labor Law: The “Flexicurity” Act
Companies can use temporary employment contracts more than they could in
the past;
A series of temporary employment contracts will, under certain conditions,
lead to a permanent contract;
Agreements between employees and temporary work agencies will now be
considered as employment contracts;
Notice periods are shortened and simplified;
Procedures for dismissal on economic, technical, and organizational grounds
are shortened;
Unemployment benefits are reduced if the employer awards severance pay.
SOURCE: EIROline (1999a).
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rights to statutory holidays, sick pay, and maternity leave as part of the
general reform of labor law, and these rights to equal treatment were
strengthened by the adoption of the directive on fixed-contract work
into national law in April 2001. Now, after four years of “consecutive”
fixed-term contracts workers became permanent employees. Moves to
regulate temporary agency work have been slower. In 1999, the gov-
ernment proposed the first substantial change in the regulation of tem-
porary agency work since the early 1970s (Department of Trade and
Industry, 1999). The precise nature of this re-regulation is still subject
to consultation. Existing regulation has been in place since 1976, with
the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses
Regulations Act. This act only allowed temporary employment agen-
cies to be established under license from the Secretary of State. In
1994, this act was repealed by the then-Conservative government and
replaced in 1995 with the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act,
designed to facilitate subcontracting, including the use of temporary
agency work. No attempt was made to connect the regulation of this
type of nonstandard employment to the rest of the labor market, as had
occurred in the Netherlands. More specifically, the U.K. reforms of
temporary agency work shy away from offering workers a permanent
contract under any circumstances, again in contrast to the Dutch
reforms.
Given these differences in the regulatory frameworks in the Neth-
erlands and the United Kingdom, we explore in the next section how
the quality of nonstandard work in both countries compares. 
NONSTANDARD WORKERS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
In both countries, the age and gender profile of nonstandard work-
ers is similar and mirrors the picture found in other EU member states.
The majority of part-time workers are women (Table 3.2), a pattern that
is replicated in every member state. The gender composition of fixed-
term contract work is more even, but women are overrepresented in
this form of employment relative to their share of all employment.
Women hold just under half of the fixed-term contracts in the EU-15,
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and more than half of these contracts in some member states, including
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
The rate of fixed-term contracts and part-time work is higher for
women than men in every age group (Table 3.3). Fixed-term contracts
tend to be concentrated among young workers because of probation
and training periods and the shortage of open-ended vacancies for new
entrants. The higher rates of fixed-term work among women suggest
that they are less able to secure open-ended contracts than are men.
Perhaps this is because they are segregated into more insecure seg-
ments of the labor market, or are reentering the labor market after an
absence for child-rearing and may only be able to obtain temporary
employment. Women may also opt for temporary employment owing
to child care constraints. 
Male part-time employment is largely confined to students and
other young labor market entrants or older workers nearing retirement
age (Table 3.3). In recent years, men’s involvement in part-time work
has increased sharply, and it appears to be dispersing somewhat into
the middle-age range (Delsen 1998). The Netherlands leads the way in
the growth of part-time work among men in EU countries. Nonethe-
less, part-time work remains rare for men in their core working years.
In contrast, large proportions of employed women work part-time at
this stage in their life, often associated with the onset of motherhood
when part-time jobs provide a means for women to combine employ-
ment with domestic responsibilities. 
There are significant national differences in the extent to which
mothers of young children are employed on a full-time or part-time
basis in the different member states, and these international compari-
sons reinforce the similarity observed between the Netherlands and the
Table 3.2 Gender Composition of Part-Time and Fixed-Term 
Employment, 1999






United Kingdom 80 52
EU-15 80 49
70Table 3.3 The Rate of Part-Time and Fixed-Term Contracts by Age Group and Gender in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, 1999
Employed men, by age Employed women, by age
15–24 25–49 50–64 65+ All 15–24 25–49 50–64 65+ All
Percent who work part-time
Netherlands 54 10 17 72 18 67 68 75 91 69
United Kingdom 25 4 10 67 9 41 42 51 88 44
EU-15 16 4 6 42 6 30 33 38 60 34
Percent with fixed-term contracts
Netherlands 5 3 1 * 9 6 7 2 — 15
United Kingdom 2 3 1 * 6 2 4 1 * 7
EU-15 5 6 1 * 12 5 8 1 * 14
NOTE: Fixed-term is determined by asking employees whether their contract has a fixed rather than open-ended duration due to either a
specified date, the completion of a task or assignment, or the return of another employee.
— indicates data unreliable due to sample size. * indicates less than 0.5%. 
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey 1999, Tables 28 and 34.
Regulatory Convergence? 71
United Kingdom. In both countries, maternal employment is predomi-
nantly part-time, in contrast to most other member states (Rubery,
Smith, and Fagan 1998). In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,
labor market participation increased for mothers beginning in the
1970s, largely through part-time employment. This occurred in the
context of limited public provision of child care services (in contrast to
a number of the other member states, such as the Nordic countries or
France) and in cultural climates that did not favor full-time employ-
ment for mothers (O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998). These institutional con-
texts have played an important role in shaping women’s labor supply,
and it is only in recent years that the Dutch and U.K. governments have
begun to increase the public resources allocated to child care services.
Overall, in the EU-15, 11 percent of part-time employees are stu-
dents or trainees, 17 percent work part-time because they were unable
to find full-time work, and 60 percent had chosen part-time work over
full-time work (Table 3.4). Among those who work part-time, women
are more likely than men to have selected this in preference to full-time
work, and are less likely to be working part-time on an involuntary
basis or because they are in education or training. This tendency is
even more pronounced among women in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. As we discussed above, this reflects the fact that
part-time employment has become the established practice for mothers
with young children in both countries. The main difference between
part-time employees in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is
found among men. In the Netherlands, nearly half of the men
employed part-time have selected this arrangement in preference to
full-time work, and only 7 percent are working part-time because they
could not find full-time employment. In contrast, 21 percent of the men
employed part-time in the United Kingdom are doing so on an involun-
tary basis, mirroring the wider pattern in the EU-15.
Not surprisingly, a higher proportion of fixed-term contracts are
involuntary compared with part-time contracts. Nearly two in five
employees with fixed-term contracts in the EU-15 are in this situation
because they could not find permanent employment, and one quarter
are on training or probation contracts. Only 9 percent said that they did
not want a permanent job. There is little difference by gender in the
reasons for holding fixed-term contracts at the EU-15 level. The profile
of fixed-term contract workers in the Netherlands and the United King-
72Table 3.4 Individual Explanations for Working in Part-Time or Fixed-Term Jobs, 1999
EU-15 NL UK
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
Reason for working part-time (%)
Could not find full-time job 17 24 15 4 7 4 10 21 8
Did not want full-time job 60 36 65 72 50 80 73 42 80
Education/training 11 25 8 19 35 13 15 33 10
Illness/disability 2 5 2 4 8 3 2 3 1
Other or no reason 10 9 10 — — — — — —
Reason for having a fixed-term 
contract (%)
Training or probation 25 27 25 3 2 1 6 6 5
Could not find permanent job 39 40 37 46 49 44 38 45 33
Did not want permanent job 9 7 11 47 44 51 29 22 35
No reason 27 26 27 4 5 4 27 27 27
NOTE: Columns may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
— indicates data unreliable due to sample size.
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey 1999, derived from Tables 29, 32, and 38. 
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dom diverges somewhat from that of the EU-15 as a whole because it
is comparatively rare for this type of contract to be used as a formal
means of training or probation in either country. Instead, those with
fixed-term contracts fall fairly evenly between two categories: those
who could not find permanent employment and those who are not
looking for permanent employment. In both countries, women were
notably more likely than men to say that they did not want a permanent
job. This may be because they have selected temporary employment
because it affords them some flexibility to schedule their time around
domestic commitments. For example, in a recent U.K. study, 70 per-
cent of temporary workers said that there were certain advantages to
this type of employment. Of this group, men were more likely to list
pay and benefits while women were more likely to list the convenience
of working-time arrangements (Tremlett and Collins 1999). 
Overall, the age and gender profile of part-time and temporary
workers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is similar; how-
ever, there are two differences of note. First, nonstandard work is even
more widespread in the Netherlands than in the United Kingdom, par-
ticularly part-time work. The rate of part-time work in the Netherlands
is such that it is the only member state in which the majority of
employed women and a sizable minority of men are now working part-
time in their core working years, and with relatively few doing so on an
involuntary basis. Furthermore, there is widespread support among the
Dutch workforce for a further expansion of part-time working, with a
higher share of both men and women stating that their preferred work-
ing hours are part-time than in any other member state (Fagan and
European Foundation 2001). The Dutch workforce has negotiated a
sustained reduction in full-time working hours since the mid 1980s,
from a norm of 40 hours a week to the current 36-hour week for more
than half of the workforce. Second, compared with the United King-
dom, a larger proportion of temporary workers in the Netherlands have
selected this work option over permanent employment, again suggest-
ing a greater degree of employee choice. In the following section, we
review in which sectors part-time and temporary work is being per-
formed in both countries.
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NONSTANDARD JOBS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
The industrial and occupational structure of employment in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands is very similar, and is dominated
by service-sector activities (Table 3.5). The main difference between
the two countries is that a higher proportion of employment in the
Netherlands is concentrated in professional and related occupations.
There are also similarities between both countries in the patterns of
nonstandard work. The highest rates of part-time work in both coun-
tries are in the service sectors, particularly in hotels and catering, retail,
and “other services” (see table note for definition), and exceed the use
of temporary work contracts in each sector. Another similarity is the
contractual composition of temporary employment (Table 3.6). Tempo-
rary agency work accounts for a similarly small proportion of all tem-
porary work in both countries, but it is this category that has seen the
greatest growth over the last decade. For example, in the United King-
dom, temporary agency workers as a proportion of total temporary
employment doubled between 1992 and 1996 (Forde and Slater 2001;
Sly and Stillwell 1997).
There are also some salient differences in the economic profile of
nonstandard work in both countries as shown in Table 3.5. First, there
are several indications that nonstandard work contracts are more dis-
persed across the economy in the Netherlands than in the United King-
dom, which suggests relatively more integration with standard
contracts rather than being segregated into particular activities. The
rate of temporary employment is broadly similar in many service sec-
tors in the Netherlands, at between 8 and 10 percent, dipping to lower
rates in construction, hotels, and public administration. In contrast,
temporary employment is a particularly common feature of hotels and
“other services” in the United Kingdom. Rates of part-time work are
disproportionately high in “other services” and hotels and catering in
both countries, but part-time work is dispersed across the other sectors
to a greater extent in the Netherlands, and is quite prevalent in trans-
portation and manufacturing, for example. Occupational comparisons
show that in both countries, part-time workers are disproportionately
found in service, sales, clerical, and elementary jobs—a pattern that
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Table 3. 5 The Industrial and Occupational Structure of Employment 
and Rates of Part-Time and Temporary Work in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 1999
% of nonstandard work 








NL UK NL UK NL UK
Industrial structure
Agriculture 3 2 30 18 10 5
Manufacturing and extraction 15 19 20 8 8 4
Construction 6 7 11 6 4 4
Transport and 
communications 6 7 27 1 8 5
Financial/business services 15 15 30 19 8 6
Hotels and restaurants 3 4 60 50 5 9
Wholesale and retail 16 16 42 38 10 3
Other services 24 25 60 40 9 10
Public administration 7 6 25 15 6 6
No response 5 * — — — —
Occupational structure
Legislators and managers 12 15 17 9 2 2
Professionals and associates 36 25 38 19 7 8
Clerks 12 17 52 33 14 7
Service and sales 12 15 66 56 17 7
Agriculture and fisheries 2 1 42 14 19 3
Craft and related trades 11 12 13 5 7 3
Plant/machine operatives 7 7 21 8 10 5
Elementary occupations 8 8 61 48 24 9
Overall incidence — — 39 25 12 7
NOTE: NACE industrial classification is the NACE one-digit level. “Other services”
include education, health, and social work; other private-sector and public-sector
social services such as sanitation and leisure, and personal services (domestic clean-
ers, child care assistants outside education, hairdressing, laundry, etc.). ISCO occupa-
tional classification. Civilian workforce only. The percentages may not sum to 100%
due to rounding. 
* indicates figure less than 0.5%; — indicates not applicable.
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exists in the EU as a whole (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development 1994; Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998). However,
part-time contracts are better represented among the higher-level man-
agerial and professional occupations in the Netherlands than in the
United Kingdom, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall
rates of part-time work in each economy. Finally, fixed-term contracts
are most prevalent in elementary, clerical, and service jobs (and skilled
agricultural jobs in the Netherlands), but the relative use in profes-
sional areas differs although the absolute rate is similar. The rate of
temporary work among professionals is lower than the overall rate in
the Netherlands but is on a par with the overall rate in the United King-
dom. In the United Kingdom, 60 percent of professionals with tempo-
rary contracts are teachers and contract researchers in the education
sector, where public-sector collective agreements provide a higher
degree of job security for those on open-ended contracts than exists in
many other sectors (Sly and Stillwell 1997). 
A second important difference between the two countries is in the
relative treatment of standard and nonstandard workers in statutory
regulations on employment conditions and the social protection offered
by welfare state policies (Esping-Andersen 1990). As discussed in the
previous section, the Dutch system provides more extensive protection




















NOTE: Demand/call contracts in the Netherlands include permanent labor contracts
that include this element of variability.
SOURCE: For the United Kingdom, Income Data Services (2000) derived from Table 1;
for the Netherlands, Hesselink et al. (1999), Table 2.1.
Regulatory Convergence? 77
and a greater degree of equal treatment between standard and non-
standard workers. There are few labor cost differentials for employers
between standard and nonstandard workers as a result. The implica-
tions for the quality of nonstandard work have been demonstrated in a
number of studies using the example of part-time work. In the Nether-
lands, there is little difference in the average hourly pay of full-time
and part-time workers (Tijdens 1997; Plantenga 1997). Legislation and
collective agreements have largely established pro rata treatment,
combined with statutory minimum wage protection for all workers.
The expansion of part-time employment in some of the higher-paying
jobs, underwritten by the recently introduced rights of employees to
request part-time hours, has also helped to prevent part-time work from
becoming entirely segregated into the low-paid sectors of the economy.
In contrast, part-time workers in the United Kingdom have lower aver-
age hourly rates of pay than full-time workers. In 1999, female part-
time workers earned 61 percent of the average hourly pay of full-time
male employees (excluding overtime); the comparable ratio was 69
percent for male part-time workers (National Statistics 2001, derived
from tables F33, F34, and A13). The introduction of a minimum wage
has raised the wage rates in low-paid jobs, where part-time employees
are disproportionately represented, and thus helped to reduce—but not
eliminate—the pay penalty of working part-time. This is because
although pro rata pay is largely established in company practices, part-
time jobs are heavily concentrated in the lowest-paid sectors of the
economy. In addition, many part-time workers in the United Kingdom
are still excluded from pension and sick pay arrangements in some
companies (despite labor laws); have fewer opportunities for promo-
tion or training; may be more vulnerable to redundancy; and have more
limited paid leave entitlements (House of Commons 1999; Neathey
and Hurstfield 1995). Employers gain further cost advantages in social
security payments if they use short-hour, part-time arrangements to
maintain the employee’s earnings below a low earnings threshold
(which equates to approximately 15 hours of work per week).
The Dutch social security and pension systems are also more com-
patible with periods of part-time work or interrupted service associated
with temporary contracts than in the United Kingdom. In the Dutch
social security system, pro rata contributions are made by employer
and employee for pro rata benefits. Pension entitlements are based on
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citizenship rather than the amount of lifetime employment and earn-
ings, and thus workers with periods of employment on nonstandard
contracts fare better (Ginn and Arber 1998). 
CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF NONSTANDARD 
WORK IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
THE NETHERLANDS
The incidence of part-time and temporary employment continues
to increase across the EU. Temporary work, with the exception of a
few countries, remains relatively rare across the EU-15. Nonetheless,
temporary agency work is growing, creating a new line of emphasis in
the restructuring of particular parts of the labor market. In particular,
the complex nature of the “triangular” employment relationship
between the worker, the agency, and the firm in which the worker is
placed has caught the attention of national and EU unions (EIROline
2000a). 
As this chapter has charted, EU labor law has gradually extended
equal treatment to part-time and fixed-term contract workers. Tempo-
rary agency work reform is on the horizon as well (EIROline 2000a,
2000b), although the form that this will take remains unclear and is still
subject to negotiation between the social partners. This common
framework of EU legislation creates some pressures of convergence
across the member states, but these reforms are played out in national
arenas with different regulatory systems, political alliances, and eco-
nomic conditions. In part, these societal contexts are products of previ-
ous rounds of national and EU regulation. The articulation between EU
and national-level policies produces persistent differences in outcomes
between countries, including the quality of nonstandard work.
The path taken in the Netherlands was the result of the political
dominance of social democratic values and institutions. These pro-
duced legislation and collective agreements that encouraged the expan-
sion of nonstandard work—particularly part-time work—with a
concurrent commitment to regulating equal treatment among standard
and nonstandard work contracts. By comparison, the United Kingdom
has been driven by a neoliberal regime of limited regulation, shifting
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only moderately in emphasis under “New Labor” when they succeeded
in ejecting the Conservative party from government. Thus, for exam-
ple, the narrow definition of a comparator for equal treatment of part-
time and full-time workers has been retained despite lobbying by trade
unions, while the proposed re-regulation of the temporary industry has
been watered down after months of lobbying by the Recruitment and
Employment Confederation.
The example of the Netherlands demonstrates how nonstandard
work conditions need not be “contingent” in the sense of precarious
contracts and uncertain volumes of work. Most part-time work in the
Netherlands involves a permanent contract with a fixed number of
hours, and the recent flexicurity reforms extend the contractual obliga-
tions between employers and workers hired through temporary work
agencies. Statute and widespread coverage of collective agreements
place effective regulations on employment conditions and equal treat-
ment, curtailing the penalties associated with nonstandard work, in
contrast to those of the less-regulated U.K. context. Even more favor-
able integrated forms of part-time work develop in “reduced hour”
arrangements, in which workers have switched from full-time to part-
time hours in their current job. Greater employee rights to obtain this
form of part-time work have been introduced in the Netherlands, and
established examples can also be found in some of the other member
states, for example the Swedish parental leave system and the French
public sector.
The expansion of nonstandard work in the Netherlands has contrib-
uted to the so-called “Dutch Miracle,” a 20-year period of job-intensive
employment growth (even when expressed as full-time equivalents)
and nearly full employment, albeit with low participation rates among
the older workforce (Visser and Hemerijck 1997, Visser 1999). How-
ever, this model of labor market reform was dependent on a number of
specific and favorable economic and political conditions, including an
inclusive welfare state regime, centrally institutionalized collective
bargaining mechanisms involving a powerful trade union movement,
high wage and productivity levels, and a large pool of available women
outside the labor market. The Dutch model cannot be simply uprooted
from these conditions and exported wholesale to other countries, but it
provides useful policy lessons that can be adapted to other societal con-
texts.
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Furthermore, although the situation for nonstandard workers is
much rosier in the Netherlands relative to the United Kingdom and
many other countries, it is not perfect. For example, the extension of
equal treatment to marginal part-time workers (fewer than 12 hours per
week) has been slower than that for other part-time workers, and part-
time work is still mainly a female undertaking, thus reinforcing gender
segregation of the labor market and men’s lower involvement in
parenting and other time-consuming care work (Plantenga 1997). Poli-
cies are needed to develop part-time work as a gender-neutral option
for the work-life balance rather than a female-dominated segment of
employment. Temporary contract work is still an inferior and involun-
tary option for a large proportion of this segment of the workforce, and
better trend data are required to monitor the impact of different forms
of nonstandard work on employment trajectories and advancement
over different periods, particularly in the projected future downturns in
the business cycle (Walker 2001).
Thus, there is now a substantial framework of EU law to normalize
nonstandard work through the principle of equal treatment and other
protective measures. However, there is still much work to be done to
effectively implement and develop this form of work in many member
states. Furthermore, these regulatory developments in labor law coexist
with welfare state regimes that still remain for the most part organized
around the norm of full-time standard employment, penalizing those
with periods of nonstandard work in their employment histories (Grim-
shaw and Rubery 1997; Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998). As the EU
plays an ever-greater role in setting the parameters for individual
nations’ regulation of their own labor markets as part of the wider eco-
nomic agenda then the political pressures toward convergence will
continue. However, this is likely to coexist with a continued divergence
between those countries such as the Netherlands whose employment
law reform often prefigures that at the EU level, and the United King-
dom, whose government, at best, seeks to manage the effects of EU
reform, and at worse, seeks to oppose it. 
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Notes
1. To give a sense of the circularity of some current debates, over two decades ago
Sergio Ricca wrote about temporary work: “[It] has been one of the most hotly
debated topics of recent years. So spectacular has been its development that politi-
cians and legislators have been forced to come to grips with it even before econo-
mists and sociologists have had time to explain the phenomenon” (1982, p. 141).
2. For example, a 30-hour threshold is used in official statistics in the United King-
dom, while a 35-hour threshold is used in Sweden.
3. In the case of temporary work, there is no standard European definition (Michon
2000; Goudswaard and de Nanteuil 2000). Instead, each member country has its
own categorization method for work arrangements that fall under the definition of
“temporary work” (see the third section of this chapter). In an analysis of tempo-
rary employment in Britain, Casey (1988, p. 3) provides 11 definitions. (1) con-
sultants or freelancers; (2) labor-only subcontractors; (3) casual workers; (4)
seasonal workers; (5) fixed-term contract workers; (6) workers with a contract
dischargeable by performance; (7) workers on training contracts; (8) temporary
workers on indefinite contracts; (9) agency workers; (10) employees of works
contractors; and (11) participants in special programs for the unemployed. 
4. This, however, is only one term used. For example, in referring to the industry
Mangum, Mayell, and Nelson (1985) refer to the “temporary help industry”; Peck
and Theodore (2001) prefer “temp industry,” while Segal and Sullivan (1999) use
the term “temporary services industry.” The organization is variously referred to
as: “temporary work agency” (Michon 2000); “temporary employment agency”
(Forde 1997); “labor market intermediaries” (Mangum, Mayell, and Nelson
1985); “temporary work organization” (Ricca 1982); and “private employment
services” (Walwei 1998). 
5. The self-employed use their own tools and capital to supply goods and services. A
distinction can be made between the genuine and the “dependent,” “notional,” or
“controlled self-employed.” This latter group of “dependent self-employment”
has no employees and largely relies on selling their own labor, perhaps with some
limited capital input in the form of tools. Often, this group regularly works for a
limited number of companies in relationships that are similar to that of employees
but that avoid many of the regulations on employers. This form of self-employ-
ment is common for construction workers and hairdressers in the United King-
dom, for example. Another, similar term commonly used in the United States is
“independent contract work,” in which the workers supply their labor but no tools
or capital. “Freelance workers” have a contract to provide services to a firm rather
than an employment contract, and the term is largely associated with professional
services. In the EU-15, self-employment in services accounted for 9 percent of all
employment in 1998, and self-employment in industry accounted for another 3
percent of all employment. Some proportion of this will be in new forms of self-
employment, but it is difficult to identify different forms of self-employment in
most existing survey series.
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6. Employers’ interests in the extension of working-time flexibility to meet produc-
tion requirements are quite distinct from employees’ interests in obtaining more
flexibility in how they organize their working time through “time sovereignty” or
“time autonomy.”
7. The question about open-ended, fixed-term contracts is only asked of the
employed who state that they are employees. It will fail to pick up people who are
regularly employed on short fixed-term contracts (either with the same or differ-
ent employers) but who were not employed in the reference week.
8. In addition, 90 percent of U.K. workplaces subcontract one or more services,
mainly for building maintenance, cleaning, security, transport, and training (Cully
et al. 1999).
9. The Dutch “polder” model of economic and civic life encourages tripartite ways
of negotiation. Policy and legislation are developed in discussion between gov-
ernment, national employers’ associations, and trade unions. These regulations
are then worked out in more detail at the sector level and in specific detail at the
enterprise level.
10. It is estimated that the 11 percent of part-time employees (2–3 percent of all
employees) that are excluded by the eight-hour threshold are mostly students
(Hepple and Hakim 1997, p. 670).
11. For a review of the term, see Wilthagen (1998).
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